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How are biases encoded in our representations of social
categories? Philosophical and empirical discussions of
implicit bias overwhelmingly focus on salient or statisti-
cal associations between target features and representa-
tions of social categories. These are the sorts of
associations probed by the Implicit Association Test and
various priming tasks. In this paper, we argue that these
discussions systematically overlook an alternative way in
which biases are encoded, that is, in the dependency net-
works that are part of our representations of social catego-
ries. Dependency networks encode information about how
features in a conceptual representation depend on each
other. This information determines the degree of centrality
of a feature for a conceptual representation. Importantly,
centrally encoded biases systematically disassociate from
those encoded in salient-statistical associations. Further-
more, the degree of centrality of a feature determines its
cross-contextual stability: in general, the more central a
feature is for a concept, the more likely it is to survive
into a wide array of cognitive tasks involving that con-
cept. Accordingly, implicit biases that are encoded in the
central features of concepts are predicted to be more resil-
ient across different tasks and contexts. As a result, the
distinction between centrally encoded and salient-
statistical biases has important theoretical and practical
implications.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Our representations of social categories encode stereotypes and implicit biases that can deeply affect
our social judgments and behavior. Some well-known pernicious examples of implicit biases include
pairs such as <BLACK, +AGGRESSIVE> and <WOMAN, +BAD AT MATH>. How are such
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biases encoded in our stereotypes or representations of social categories? Relatedly, are all socially
significant biases encoded in the same way or can biases be encoded in fundamentally different
ways? Despite the increasing interest in implicit bias,1 we lack satisfactory answers to these ques-
tions. This is surprising given certain trends and tensions in the literature. On the one hand, over-
views of the empirical data suggest that various measures of implicit bias tap into different sorts of
cognitive processes.2 On the other hand, most empirical and philosophical investigations proceed as
if implicit bias is a single, uniform phenomenon.3 Specifically, as we show in section 1, philosophi-
cal and empirical discussions of implicit bias focus on either salient or statistical associations
between target features and representations of social categories. While these kinds of associations
can encode implicit biases and affect judgment and behavior, we argue that other forms of bias
encoding may affect social cognition in even more dramatic ways.
The main goal of this paper is to show that, due to their narrow focus on salient-statistical asso-
ciations, discussions of implicit bias systematically overlook an alternative way in which biases are
encoded, that is, in the dependency networks that are part of our representations of social categories.
Dependency networks are structures that capture information about how features in a conceptual
representation depend on each other, which in turn determines their degree of centrality. In sections
2 and 3, we show that socially significant biases can be encoded in the dependency networks of our
representations of social categories. Crucially, these biases can be disassociated from those encoded
in salient-statistical associations. In other words, there are important forms of social bias that may
not show up in measures of salient-statistical associations, but which nevertheless exert a significant
influence on judgments and actions. As we argue in section 4, salient-statistical and centrally
encoded biases are predicted to behave differently in many cognitive tasks. Specifically, the degree
of centrality of a bias determines its cross-contextual stability.
The view that significant social biases can be encoded in dependency networks has important
empirical and philosophical implications. We discuss these in sections 4 and 5. On the empirical
side, our notion of centrally encoded biases can shed light on some perplexing patterns in current
results, such as the cross-contextual instability of implicit biases and the lack of correlation between
different measures and experimental manipulations in studies of bias. On the philosophical side, our
account suggests new ways to approach foundational questions, such as whether implicit biases are
beliefs. Ultimately, our aim is to provide a more fine-grained taxonomy of socially relevant biases
that will serve as a useful starting point for future empirical and philosophical investigations.
2 | IMPLICIT BIAS AND SALIENT-STATISTICAL ASSOCIATIONS
Most psychologists and philosophers would agree that, broadly speaking, implicit biases rest on
associations between features and our representations of social categories. In this section, we argue
that the kinds of implicit biases usually investigated by psychologists and discussed by philosophers
1 See, for example, Brownstein and Saul’s (2016a, 2016b) recently released two-volume collection on the metaphysics and ethics of
implicit bias. See also Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, and Banaji (2009) and Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji (2007) for overviews
of the empirical literature.
2 For instance, individual scores on various implicit measures only weakly correlate (Nosek et al., 2007), and in some cases, mea-
sures of implicit bias correlate with measures of explicit bias and predict overt behavior, but in other cases they do not (Greenwald
et al., 2009). This suggests that although the results of these individual tests of implicit bias are robust and reliable, the various tests
may be tapping into different cognitive structures.
3 There are some notable exceptions to this trend, for example, Holroyd and Sweetman (2016). Following Amodio and Devine
(2006), Holroyd and Sweetman distinguish implicit semantic associations, implicit affective evaluations, and implicit behavioral moti-
vations as fundamentally different kinds of implicit bias. We will offer a different way to taxonomize implicit bias. Our main focus is
not on differences in the nature of the relata, but on differences in the kinds of relations.
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are salient-statistical biases. The characteristic property of this class of biases is that they depend on
salient or statistical associations between features and representations of social categories. As we
will see, current measures of implicit bias are variations of standard measures of salient-statistical
associative strength.
Explicit intergroup bias consists of conscious, reflectively endorsed evaluations of social groups. For
instance, people who endorse the idea that women naturally are less intelligent than men have an explicit
bias against women. Although some people have and are comfortable expressing explicit biases, many peo-
ple sincerely disavow them. However, a wealth of empirical evidence suggests implicit bias is extremely
widespread even among those who reflectively endorse egalitarian ideas (De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba,
Spruyt &Moors, 2009). Implicit biases are representations or evaluations of social groups that occur sponta-
neously, are difficult to bring under reflective control, and are sometimes opaque to introspection.4
Testing for explicit bias is relatively straightforward. You can just ask people what they think
about various social groups and try to control for social desirability censorship. Testing for implicit
bias is trickier because, for the most part, people either are unwilling to report or are not consciously
aware of implicit processes, and thus you cannot simply ask them about their implicit biases.
Instead, experimenters construct tasks that are designed to elicit behavior that is sensitive to such
processes, and from the elicited behavior they estimate subjects’ implicit bias. For instance, experi-
menters measure how quickly and accurately subjects associate a social category (e.g., WOMAN)
with a feature (e.g., +NURTURING) or the extent to which a priming stimulus representing the
social category facilitates a response involving the target feature.
What kind of information is encoded in these sorts of associations between features and our con-
cepts or representations of social categories? And how, precisely, are these associations measured?
To answer these questions, it is useful to review some key measures and results in the psychology
of concepts. Many psychologists hold that concepts, including those relevant to social cognition, are
encoded as sets of weighted features, often called prototypes (Rosch, 1975; Rosch & Mervis, 1975).
Prototype theory offers a useful way to begin to understand the ways in which features can be asso-
ciated with socially relevant categories. On this view, a concept C typically includes features, f1…
fn, and each feature is assigned a weight, wi. There are different accounts of what determines the
weight of a feature. A standard view is that weights are a function of statistical properties, such as
cue validity, and saliency properties, such as availability and prominence (Hampton, 2006; Machery,
2009; Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010; Murphy, 2002).5 The cue validity of a feature f for a
TABLE 1
Relation/Term Types of measures Examples
Saliency: signal-to-noise ratio Prominence How prominent in your conception of
lions is it that they have manes?
Availability Lions have manes (yes/no)
Statistical: evidence provided
by a feature for a category
Cue validity: P(category|feature) Of all things that have manes,
what percentage are lions?
Typicality: P(feature|category) Of all the lions, what percentage has manes?
4 Implicit biases, as traditionally conceived, result from learned associations between features and social categories, and they influ-
ence our cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses. Though explicit and implicit biases should be distinguished, they can of
course align. See Holroyd (2016). For example, one may be both explicitly and implicitly sexist insofar as one reflectively endorses
sexist ideas and habitually and reflexively thinks, feels, and behaves toward women in sexist ways.
5 We should note, however, that there are richer notions of prototypes in the psychological literature. For example, Hampton (2006)
argues that prototypes often also encode additional structural relations between features and dimensions, such as dependency and
degree of centrality. We discuss these kinds of relations between features in the next sections.
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category C is the probability that some entity x belongs to C given that x has f. The notion of saliency
is less precise, but it is usually taken to capture a signal-to-noise ratio, such as the prominence of a fea-
ture f for category C, or the availability of f in response to names or instances of C. To illustrate, the
black and white stripes of zebras have a high cue validity and saliency, and as a result are encoded as
a highly weighted feature in our conception of zebras. This is not the case for the feature +HAS
HAIR. Accordingly, we expect that priming studies should find a significantly stronger effect between
<“zebras” and “stripes”> than between <“zebras” and “hair”>. The point here is that degree of asso-
ciation can often be understood as a function of cue validity and saliency. We will call this subclass of
associations salient-statistical associations. Table 1 summarizes the main kinds of salient-statistical
associations and briefly presents an example of the corresponding experimental measures.6
Going back to measures of implicit bias, we can now describe in more detail what sorts of associa-
tions between features and concepts of socially relevant categories they uncover. The main point we
want to make is that we can understand the target associations as encoding properties such cue validity
and saliency. The reason is simple: most empirical studies of implicit bias are engineered to uncover
salient-statistical associations such as those listed in Table 1. To see this, consider the main experi-
mental paradigms for investigating implicit bias: the Implicit Association Test (IAT) and priming
tasks. The IAT measures how quickly and accurately subjects categorize stereotypic and counter-
stereotypic associations (Greenwald et al., 2009; Greenwald, Mcghee & Schwartz, 1998). In one well-
known version of the IAT, subjects are instructed to categorize as quickly and accurately as possible
faces of Black men with pleasant words (e.g., “joy,” “love,” “peace”) and faces of White European
American men with unpleasant words (e.g., “agony,” “terrible,” “horrible”). Subjects are then
instructed to categorize the stimuli according to the opposite rule: Black faces with unpleasant words
and White faces with pleasant words. If subjects categorize faster and more accurately according to
one of these rules, they are said to have an implicit bias. As it turns out, most White Americans more
strongly associate Black with unpleasant words and White with pleasant words than Black with pleas-
ant and White with unpleasant. For our purposes, what matters here is that this IAT is measuring
salient-statistical associations, in particular, availability. When subjects more quickly and accurately
categorize according to one rule, the association that that rule represents is more available to them.
Thus, the data show that, for White American participants, categorizing someone as Black makes the
unpleasant features more salient or available than when categorizing someone as White.
A second method for investigating implicit bias is through priming tasks that measure the effects
of subtle cues in the environment on our emotional and cognitive responses (Decoster & Claypool,
2004; Fiske & Taylor, 2013, pp. 32–37).7 Subliminal priming occurs when a stimulus is presented
to subjects too quickly to be consciously processed. Conscious priming occurs when the subject
consciously perceives the prime but has no awareness of its effects on subsequent reactions. The
6 A clarification is in order. The main reason why we present measures from prototype theory is to taxonomize “associations” in
terms of the kinds of information they encode. The kinds of information are operationalized in terms of measuring paradigms, as sum-
marized in Table 1. We are not committed to any specific account of the nature of the mental structures that underlie these kinds of
associations. (Although we do think that, ultimately, our account provides some useful constraints and suggestions for tackling these
questions, as we discuss in section 5.) Accordingly, when we talk of the “prototype” of concept C, we simply mean the set of features
that are available, cue-valid, and typical for C. When the claims are comparative, we are usually interested in results such as that f is
more available for C1 than for C2. These comparative results can be crucial even if the association between, say, f and C1 is not strong
in absolute terms. Furthermore, for our purposes, we need not place any restrictions on the nature of these features (e.g., whether they
are amodal, modal, or mixed representations). Finally, different theories of concepts, not to mention different implementation
accounts, can account for these sorts of relations in different ways (for interestingly different accounts, see Lakoff, 1987, Fodor,
1998, and Prinz, 2002.
7 In addition to affective and cognitive priming, many studies report evidence of behavioral priming, for example, Bargh, Chen &
Burrows, 1996. The data for behavioral priming are mixed and complicated, and for these reasons we will not discuss them here.
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most relevant kind of priming task for our purposes measures cognitive priming, which occurs when
subtle cues in the environment activate concepts and influence subjects’ judgments. For example,
Graham and Lowery (2004) report that police officers and juvenile probation officers subliminally
primed with words related to the racial category Black are more likely to interpret a hypothetical
adolescent (whose race is unspecified) as having a worse personality, being more blameworthy,
more likely to reoffend, and they recommended harsher punishments. Importantly, these priming
tasks measure the strength of subjects’ salient-statistical associations between a racial category and
various features. Put in our terminology, the Graham and Lowery study finds that the subjects in the
experiment have a representation of Black people in which delinquency is a prominent feature.
We have just seen that the kinds of associations measured by current empirical research on
implicit bias are salient-statistical associations, based on variations of the measures outlined in
Table 1. As a result of the overwhelming focus on these measures within social psychology, philo-
sophical accounts of implicit bias also tend to focus on these kinds of associations. Indeed, some
accounts focus on these associations to such an extent that it seems fair to say that they tacitly
assume that all significant social biases are encoded in salient-statistical associations between fea-
tures and our representations of categories. We think this is a fundamental mistake.
Assume for a moment that salient-statistical associations are fully determined by properties such
as cue validity and saliency and that we know the full associative profile of concepts C1 and C2. In
other words, we know what features constitute or are associated with C1 and C2, and know, in each
case, the full salient-statistical profiles of those features. Does it follow that we have all the informa-
tion we need to determine all significant biases? We clearly have information to determine some
biases. For example, suppose our investigation is about POODLE versus PIT BULL and that the
results of an IAT or priming task indicate that the feature +AGGRESSIVE is more strongly associ-
ated with PIT BULL than POODLE. If, in fact, poodles are just as aggressive as pit bulls, we can
take this pattern of results as evidence of a bias against pit bulls. However, suppose that measures of
salient-statistical associations suggest that +AGGRESSIVE is associated with roughly equal strength
to POODLE and to PIT BULL. Should we conclude that there is no bias? No. Independently of
standard worries about experimental design and drawing conclusions from null results, there may be
substantial biases that these measures simply are not designed to detect.
We shall argue below that social biases can be encoded in our concepts in ways that systemati-
cally disassociate from salient-statistical properties.8 Furthermore, the basic properties of these
biases suggest that they likely have a substantial and pervasive effect on everyday social cognition.
If we confine our investigations of bias to those that use salient-statistical measures, we will con-
tinue to overlook this important class of biases.
3 | CONCEPTUAL CENTRALITY AND IMPLICIT BIAS
Concepts, we have suggested, can be represented as sets of weighted features that encode informa-
tion such as cue validity and saliency. We argued that the kinds of implicit biases currently
8 Some philosophers object to the identification of concepts with representations that encode features that do not strictly determine
their extensions. On this view, mental representations such as prototypes may be part of our conceptions of categories, but in general
they are not strictly part of our concepts. To be sure, most philosophers who defend this idea, including Rey (1983), Burge (1993),
and Fodor (1998), do not reject the psychological reality of prototypes: in one form or another, they acknowledge that prototypes are
key components of our best empirical models of categorization and induction. In this paper, we will employ the term “concept” in the
wider, psychological sense. Philosophers who prefer to use the narrower sense should interpret our discussion as being, for the most
part, about conceptions rather than concepts. Using this terminology, the theme of this paper is about how our conceptions of social
categories encode biases, and how that in turn affects cognitive processes such as categorization and induction.
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investigated can be understood in terms of those structures. However, most scientists and philoso-
phers who work on concepts argue that they also encode other kinds of information, in particular,
the degree of centrality of their associated features.9 Our task here is not to directly defend the idea
that concepts encode centrality. The relevant results are widely accepted, even by proponents of
more recent versions of prototype theory (Hampton, 2006). Instead, we aim to (a) spell out the ways
in which important social biases can be encoded in the structures that determine centrality, (b) show
that, in general, these biases should be distinguished from those encoded in salient-statistical proper-
ties, and (c) discuss some of the unique properties of centrally encoded biases.
There are various formal models of centrality. We will adopt an account that is intuitive, easy to
represent, and has a proven empirical track record. To say that a feature f is central in concept C is
to say that other features depend on f more than f depends on them (Sloman & Lagnado, 2015; Slo-
man, Love & Ahn, 1998; Thagard, 1989). The notion of dependence is abstract and ranges over
more specific dependencies such as causal and explanatory relations.10 To illustrate, take the concept
CHAIR and its features +HAS A BACK and +USED FOR SITTING. Intuitively, what explains
why chairs have a back is that they are designed for sitting. Other typical properties of chairs, for
example, concerning their height and materials, are explained by the fact that chairs are normally
designed to be used for sitting. At the same time, these properties are relatively independent of the
fact that chairs also normally have a back. It follows that more features depend on +USED FOR
SITTING than on +HAS A BACK, and hence the former is a comparatively more central feature of
CHAIR. Note that centrality is a matter of degrees. In particular, a feature can be central without
being an essence in the traditional sense, and the high centrality of f in C does not entail that it is
necessary that every C is f.11
To understand the way in which biases can be encoded in dependency networks, we first need
to explain the distinction between the degree of centrality of features and their salient-statistical
associative properties. The crucial point to make is that centrality and salient-statistical properties
disassociate (Sloman et al., 1998).
• Feature f can be central in C and not have either high cue validity or high saliency for C. For
example, +HAS A HEART is a central feature of tigers. However, it does not have high cue
validity because so many non-tigers also have a heart. This feature also is not salient because,
in the usual encounters, we cannot use it to pick out tigers.
• Feature f can have high cue validity or saliency for C and not be central. +YELLOW is a typ-
ical and distinctive feature of taxicabs in the United States. However, it is not central because
other important features of cabs do not depend on their being yellow as opposed to some
other color that could stand out in the relevant ways.
9 Many philosophers argue that concepts encode something like centrality, partly because this provides concepts with stability across
informational contexts and cognitive tasks (Putnam, 1992). Since the 1980s, psychologists have developed essentialist theories
according to which conceptual structures encode the degree of centrality of features (Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Keil, 1989).
10 There are two ways of interpreting the claim that dependency relations are abstract. (a) We can hold that certain levels of proces-
sing (e.g., fast, intuitive processes) are sensitive only to relatively abstract and content-less asymmetric dependencies. (b) We can say
that most levels of processing are sensitive to more specific dependency relations, say, to causal dependency, but that our theoretical
claims do not depend on those details. For our purposes, we can leave this issue unresolved, but a full account of the behavior of cen-
trally encoded biases should ultimately address this question.
11 This basic framework is compatible with various versions of essentialism. One could, for example, stipulate that for a feature f to
be essential for C just is for f to have a high degree of centrality for C. Our claim that biases can be encoded in dependency relations
does not commit us to even this version of essentialism. For as we will show, biases can be encoded in dependency networks even
when they do not have a high degree of centrality.
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These intuitive examples illustrate dissociations that have been systematically and empirically
established. Consider the main results of Sloman et al.’s (1998) foundational paper on conceptual cen-
trality. Assume that features f1… fn are the constituents of concept C. Sloman and colleagues show
that different measures of centrality correlate in their ordering of f1… fn, but do not correlate with any
of the orderings determined by measures of either cue validity or saliency. In general, even if we show
that feature f is strongly associated with C using experimental paradigms that are sensitive to salient-
statistical properties (e.g., IAT and priming paradigms), it does not follow that f is particularly central
in C. Similarly, even if we show that f is central in C according to measures that are sensitive to depen-
dency structures, it does not follow that f has a high salient-statistical association with C.
In investigations of biases relevant to social cognition, theorists often are interested in establish-
ing whether feature f plays a different role in concept C1 versus C2. The previous observations entail
that even if measures of associative strength indicate that f has the same role (e.g., the same saliency
or cue validity) for concept C1 and C2, it does not follow that f plays the same role in a broader
sense. In particular, f may still substantially differ with respect to its role in the dependency net-
works of C1 versus C2, and in its corresponding degree of centrality in each case.
To illustrate, suppose we are trying to determine the role of +HAS A BACK in the concepts
OFFICE CHAIR and BREAKFAST CHAIR. Suppose we get measures for the saliency and cue
validity of +HAS A BACK in each case, and the scores are not significantly different. Given the
lack of correlation between salient-associative properties and the degree of centrality of features, this
pattern of results would leave wide open the possibility that +HAS A BACK still is more central
for one of these concepts. For example, suppose that OFFICE CHAIR has the feature +USED TO
SIT FOR MANY HOURS, which itself is relatively central and dependent on +HAS A BACK.
Assuming there are no relevant additional differences in the dependency network for +HAS A
BACK in each concept, it follows that this feature would be more central for OFFICE CHAIR than
for BREAKFAST CHAIR. This holds despite the fact that salient-associative measures would not
detect that difference.
When we consider concepts relevant to the study of biases—for example, concepts of gender,
race, ethnicity, and different social roles—the distinction between a feature’s salient-statistical scores
and its degree of centrality becomes crucially important. For example, an influential recent study
shows that women are less represented in academic professions whose members think that success
in the field is more dependent on raw brilliance than on hard work or discipline (Leslie, Cimpian,
Meyer & Freeland, 2015). The authors argue that one factor that likely is responsible for that
distribution is the existence of gender stereotypes that encode the belief that women possess less
raw brilliance than men. Suppose we want to directly investigate whether there is in fact such a
“brilliance-gender” bias in a given social group. It should now be clear that a basic question we have
to address is this: How would this stereotype be encoded in the representations of female versus
male academics or potential academics? In light of what we have said so far, it should now be clear
that there are two possibilities to consider (not necessarily mutually exclusive): (a) the gender bias is
encoded in salient-statistical associations or (b) it is encoded in networks of dependency relations.
Focusing on (a), the hypothesis that most people implicitly or explicitly believe that males are
more likely than females to be naturally brilliant may be tested using measures of saliency-statistical
associations, for example, in priming tasks or more direct tasks that ask participants to estimate the
proportion of female professors who are brilliant and the proportion of male professors who are bril-
liant. Suppose, however, that various measures of the perceived distribution and saliency of bril-
liance in the relevant representations of male and female categories are indistinguishable. In this
case, some theorists might be tempted to conclude that we simply have mistaken pretheoretic intui-
tions about our society’s stereotypes.
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However, the considerations we have raised here suggest that, even if we get those results, we
still have to examine option (b), namely whether the hypothesized brilliance-gender stereotype is
encoded in the relevant dependency networks. Here is one way in which this could happen. Suppose
that participants implicitly or explicitly believe that most professors, male or female, are smart and
hardworking. This is perfectly compatible with the feature +HARD WORKING being more central
for FEMALE PROFESSOR than for MALE PROFESSOR, a result that can obtain if the depen-
dency of +SMART on +HARD WORK is stronger for FEMALE PROFESSOR than for MALE
PROFESSOR.12
To generalize, a concept C1 encodes a relative bias if the bias is encoded either in the salient-
statistical properties of the constituent features or in the dependency networks that connect those
features. Most empirical and theoretical studies of biases in social cognition ignore the second possi-
bility. We have focused on cases in which measures of salient-statistical associations assign feature
f a similar score for C1 as for C2, even though f is more central for C1 than for C2. These cases are
useful to emphasize the point that our empirical search for biases relevant to social cognition should
not stop at measures of salient-statistical associations, and our philosophical discussions should not
be limited to just those kinds of associations. However, we should note that determining the degree
of centrality of features is important even in cases where associative scores do differentiate between
the role of f in C1 and C2. For as we argue in section 4 below, information about the degree to
which a bias is central, and additional details of the network which encodes it, allow us to make
substantially different behavioral predictions from those we can make if we know only the bias’
salient-statistical associative strength.
4 | MEASURING DEPENDENCY NETWORKS AND CONCEPTUAL
CENTRALITY
We have argued that social biases can be encoded in the dependency networks that determine the
degree of centrality of conceptual features. We shall now describe some experimental measures of
centrality and briefly discuss how they can be adapted to the study biases. This is an important task.
One reason that most empirical studies of implicit bias focus on salient-statistical associations is that
measures such as IATs are widely accessible, have provided us with massive amounts of data, and
arguably overcome the problem self-censorship faced by studies of explicit bias. So, even if we
grant, on theoretical grounds, the existence, uniqueness, and potential impact on cognition of cen-
trally encoded biases, we must also show that there are useful measures to discover these biases.
Fortunately, there are a variety of reliable measures of feature dependency and centrality. Slo-
man et al. (1998) propose and empirically substantiate the candidates presented in Table 2. To
TABLE 2
Relation/Term Types of measures Examples
Conceptual
centrality
Surprise How surprised would you be to encounter a real chair that does not have a seat?
Ease-of-imagining How easily can you imagine a real chair that does not have a seat?
Goodness-of-example How good an example of chair would you consider a chair that does not have a seat?
Similarity-to-an-ideal How similar is a chair that does not have a seat to an ideal chair?
12 For an empirical exploration of this conjecture, see Del Pinal, Madva and Reuter (2017).
102 DEL PINAL AND SPAULDING
understand the rationale for these measures, recall that a feature’s degree of centrality for a concept
C is a function of which other constituent features of C depend on it. It follows that the more central
a feature is in C, the greater the impact that eliminating that feature has on the rest of C. To illus-
trate, suppose that for CHAIR, +SEAT is more central than +FOUR LEGS. Given that more fea-
tures depend on +SEAT than on +FOUR LEGS, eliminating the former would affect more features
of CHAIR than eliminating the latter. Following this basic observation, Sloman et al. propose vari-
ous paradigms that determine the centrality of a feature f for a concept C by measuring the mutabil-
ity of f, that is, the impact that eliminating f has on C. One simple measure is called “ease-of-
imagining.” Participants are asked to perform tasks such as imagining a real chair that does not have
a seat, and to rate the difficulty of doing so. For most participants, it is significantly harder to ima-
gine a chair without a seat than one without four legs. This is not surprising: their use for sitting is
an important feature of chairs, and there are many ways to keep that function without having four
legs, but it is harder to think of an artifact that can be used for sitting but does not have a seat.
Importantly, Sloman et al. show that the way in which the four measures of centrality in Table 2
order conceptual features (a) strongly correlate with each other, and (b) do not correlate with the
order determined by standard measures of either statistical properties (including cue validity) or
saliency (including availability and prominence). Furthermore, Sloman et al. test the claim that
degree of centrality can be reduced to position in an asymmetric dependency network. For each tar-
get concept, participants are given a picture that contains randomized arrays of its main features,
and are asked to draw asymmetric dependency lines to connect them in ways that reflected their
intuitions of feature dependencies. For example, given a picture that includes the features +FOR
SITTING and +HAS A SEAT, participants could draw an arrow from the former to the latter. Using
a simple iterative linear equation, Sloman et al. could then compute the average centrality of each
feature for a given concept. The striking result is that these dependency graphs order conceptual fea-
tures in ways that strongly correlate with the measures of centrality summarized in Table 2, but that,
again, do not correlate with the order determined by any of the salient-statistical measures, including
those in Table 1.
We have, then, reliable and consistent measures of conceptual centrality. Furthermore, we
believe that, with a bit of creativity, these measures can be adapted to investigate centrally encoded
biases. Consider how the ease-of-imagining paradigm could be used to investigate the brilliance-
gender bias postulated by Leslie et al. (2015). Suppose we want to test the hypothesis that this bias
against the “natural” brilliance of women is encoded in dependency networks. Using this paradigm,
we can ask participants to rate the difficulty of imagining, say, a brilliant Harvard professor who is
not at all hardworking. One condition would involve a female and the other a male professor. Using
a between-subject design in which participants just see the female or the male version of the
vignettes would reduce the possibility of self-censorship by using, say, the male condition as an
anchor. If we obtain the result that the imagination task is rated as harder in the female than in the
male condition, this would suggest that the feature hardworking is more central in the female repre-
sentation of otherwise indistinguishable brilliant individuals. We can also combine that basic design
with more sophisticated measuring techniques. For example, we can use a mouse-tracking design to
detect whether subjects are self-censoring their responses. To implement this, we could use a
forced-choice design in which subjects are asked whether imagining the target scenario is “easy” or
“hard.” In this setup, the cursor is set at a controlled point in the screen, and subjects have to move
the cursor to click on the position of either of the response options. The trick is that the overall
mouse routes in each condition can be used to determine if subjects correct themselves along the
way to their final categorical responses in ways that betray self-censorship or, more generally, the
effect of a bias (Freeman, Dale & Farmer, 2011).
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Additional paradigms to study centrality and dependency can be found in the essentialist litera-
ture, especially within the field of developmental psychology (Carey, 2009; Johnson & Keil, 2000;
Keil, 1989). Some of these paradigms can be easily adapted to study centrally encoded biases. For
example, Del Pina, Madva and Reuter (2017) adapted a simple version of a causal reasoning task
used by Johnson and Keil (2000) to generate central features. To investigate the hypothesis that the
brilliance-gender bias is encoded in dependency structures, the authors used, in one study, partial
reasoning schemes such as the following:
Becoming a Professor is difficult.
Mary/Jack recently became a Professor.
Therefore, Mary/Jack must be ____________.
Unlike standard ways of generating features for concepts, this kind of reasoning scheme cues partic-
ipants to generate conceptual features that have central explanatory importance. The variation pre-
sented here aims to determine (against appropriate controls) whether there is a difference in the sorts
of features freely generated by participants to explain success in intellectual professions for female
versus male targets. For example, if +HARDWORK is generated more frequently for the female
than for the male version of the scheme, this would suggest that this feature is more central for
FEMALE than for MALE PROFESSOR. As in the previous example, this basic paradigm can also
be combined with techniques, such as mouse-tracking, that are more sensitive to processes of self-
correction. Although we think that simple designs such as those just described are promising, our
goal here is not to defend any particular experimental technique or way of controlling for things
such as self-censorship. The aim of this discussion of measures of centrality and feature dependen-
cies is just to provide a reasonable amount of support for the view that many of our current experi-
mental paradigms can be used to begin the empirical search for centrally encoded biases.
Now, even granting the theoretical possibility that there are centrally encoded biases, and that
we can discover them using several well-understood experimental measures, one might still question
their overall importance for everyday social cognition for the following reason. Maybe fast, intuitive
processes—which presumably make up a substantial part of social cognition—are insensitive to cen-
trally encoded biases because they are insensitive to the dependency networks that encode them.
Many scientists argue that we should think of the computational architecture of higher cognition as
divided into fast, intuitive, System 1 processes, and slow, deliberative, System 2 judgments
(Kahneman, 2011; Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010; Sloman, 2014). According to some interpreta-
tions, System 1 processes are associative in the sense that they are sensitive only to salient-statistical
structure, and they operate as a function of activation along such associative pathways. On this view,
System 1 processes could be thought to be insensitive to dependency networks, hence to feature
centrality.
However, the view that System 1 processes are insensitive to dependency structures is no longer
empirically defensible. In particular, recent studies show that fast, intuitive judgments are sensitive
to causal structures (Sloman, 2014; Sloman & Lagnado, 2015), an important class of asymmetric
dependency relations. Consider one representative example. Having yellow teeth is correlated with
lung cancer. Given that fact, consider whether or not you ought to accept the following recommen-
dation: You should whiten your teeth to lower the probability of getting lung cancer. Obviously the
answer is no; and, crucially, most people immediately and intuitively conclude that (Hagmayer &
Sloman, 2009). That answer rests on sophisticated causal information and analysis. If x has yellow
teeth and y has white teeth, then x is more likely than y to get cancer. This is because x is more
likely to be a smoker, which is the causally relevant variable for cancer. The act of whitening your
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teeth amounts to an intervention that makes the color of your teeth independent of the causally rele-
vant variable. There is plenty of evidence of this kind to support the view that fast, intuitive deci-
sions are sensitive to at least one type of dependency structures, namely to causal structures. Thus,
there is no reason to think that the intuitive processes involved in everyday social cognition are
insensitive to centrally encoded biases.
5 | SALIENT-STATISTICAL VERSUS CENTRAL FEATURES ACROSS
CONTEXTS
We have argued that biases can be encoded in the dependency networks of our representations of social
categories, and presented some promising paradigms for experimentally measuring these biases. We also
argued that if we confine our investigations to measures of salient-statistical associative strength, we will
continue to systematically overlook centrally encoded biases.13 In this section, we discuss key differences
in the cross-contextual behavior of salient-statistical versus centrally encoded biases. We shall argue that
features connected to a concept C solely via salient-statistical associations are defeasible in response to
certain changes in background information and task demands. In contrast, the more central a feature is in
C, the more stable it will be in response to similar variations in information and tasks. In general, the
degree of centrality of a feature determines its stability across variations in tasks such as social categoriza-
tion and induction. This difference between merely associative and central features has important conse-
quences for the role of each kind of implicit bias in social cognition, and helps explain otherwise
puzzling empirical findings about the weak correlation among different measures of implicit bias.
To begin our argument, we turn to some key results in studies of conceptual combination. Philoso-
phers have argued, and empirical studies have corroborated, that the salient-statistical features associ-
ated with concepts are easily dropped when those concepts enter certain combinatorial environments
(Barsalou, 1987; Fodor, 1998; Fodor & Lepore, 2002; Hampton, 2006; Murphy, 2002; Rey, 1983).
Suppose that +MANE is a feature of the prototype of LION. It is reasonable to assume that this fea-
ture has high cue validity (given a mane, the likelihood that there is a lion is high) and saliency (it is
easy to visually pick out manes). Still, this does not entail that +MANE is preserved under even trivial
conceptual combinations involving LION. Consider BABY LION, FEMALE LION, and with a dose
of imagination, TRIMMED LION. Note that these combinations are straightforwardly intersective:
We are moving from the basic level (e.g., LION) to more specific subcategories (e.g., BABY LION).
Although conceptual combination is usually studied with linguistic stimuli, similar subcategorizations
below the basic level are obviously common in nonlinguistic cognition. Suppose you are interacting
with baby lions at a nursery; to guide your thoughts and actions in that setting, you likely would use a
subcategory of LION that corresponds to something like BABY LION. As in the linguistic case, fea-
tures that we strongly associate with LION, such as +MANE, or more importantly in this setting,
+DANGEROUS, are not inherited into the relevant subcategory of BABY LIONS.14
13 We are not denying, of course, that biases encoded in the salient–statistical associations play an important role in social cognition.
For instance, implicit biases detected by salient–statistical measures can predict variability in how long we speak to someone, how we
evaluate job candidates’ resumes, our mood when subliminally exposed to faces of different races, and how far away from someone
we are likely to sit (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Greenwald et al., 2009; Lane, Banaji, Nosek & Greenwald, 2007).
14 To be clear, there are open debates about the extent to which salient–statistical features are compositional, or, more generally, sur-
vive subcategorization. Some argue that they are highly context-sensitive (Connolly, Fodor, Gleitman & Gleitman, 2007; Fodor,
1998; Fodor & Lepore, 2002; Gleitman, Connolly & Armstrong, 2012). Others argue that some components of prototypes are rela-
tively stable (Del Pinal, 2016; Hampton, 1987, 2006; Prinz, 2012). This debate includes discussions of models that specify the condi-
tions in which the salient-statistical features of concepts are dropped. As will become clear below, our central point does not depend
on assuming that prototypes are radically context sensitive.
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The compositional behavior of merely salient-statistical features sheds light on debates about
why scores across various measures of implicit bias only weakly correlate (Nosek et al., 2007).15 In
some cases, measures of implicit bias correlate with measures of explicit bias and predict overt
behavior, but in other cases they do not (Greenwald et al., 2009). Sometimes these patterns are
invoked to question the validity of such measures. To evaluate those criticisms, however, we must
take account of the following consideration. Most measures of implicit bias, we argue, detect
salient-statistical associations. If this is correct, then their lack of stability across contexts may be a
result of their behaving in the way noncentral prototype features generally behave. Specifically, as
illustrated in the case of conceptual combination, salient-statistical features often do not survive sub-
categorization, and this must be at least partly responsible for the lack of correlation among mea-
sures of implicit bias.16
The literature on conceptual combination gives us theoretical reasons to expect that implicit
biases detected by priming measures and IATs will behave in the ways described above. The follow-
ing studies on implicit bias empirically demonstrate this pattern of behavior. As is well known,
White American participants tend to display significant anti-Black implicit bias on race IATs. Govan
and Williams (2004) report that changing the subcategory of the exemplar in an IAT affects sub-
jects’ results. Typically race IATs use generic pictures of Black and White men, or generic Black
names (e.g., Tyrone) and White names (e.g., Josh). Thus, in typical race IATs, the categories are
simply Black man and White man. Govan and Williams report that when the stimuli represent
subcategories—famous and liked Black men, for example, Michael Jordan, and famous and disliked
White men, for example, Adolf Hitler—racial bias effects are completely eliminated.17 Put in our
terminology, the association between the category BLACK and negative features does not survive
subcategorization into more specific members of the class; participants did not associate those mem-
bers with negative features.
Govan and William’s experiment is somewhat extreme in that it induces participants to shift
from representations of basic level or even superordinate categories to representations of specific
categories such as FAMOUS BLACK ATHLETE, or perhaps even of individual-level categories
such as MICHAEL JORDAN. For this reason, one might accept that there was an elimination of
features of the prototypes used at the basic level, and still downplay the general relevance of these
results. However, studies that involve less extreme subcategorizations find similar patterns of results.
For example, Wittenbrink, Judd and Park (2001) report that White subjects exhibit less negativity in
response to Black faces when the Black faces are presented in the background context of a church
interior as opposed to an urban street corner. In other words, some of the features associated with
White participant’s representation of the social category BLACK did not survive into the subcate-
gory CHURCH-GOING BLACK MAN, although they did survive into the subcategory STREET
CORNER BLACK MAN.
Unlike many studies and meta-analyses of implicit bias, the two studies just described are struc-
tured to directly detect the behavior of associations across levels of categorization. These studies
15 The weak correlation between implicit measures is explained partly by low reliability of individual implicit measures. This is not
unique to implicit social cognition; it also is true of implicit memory tests. However, the correlations are weak even if we factor in
the reliability of each test, so this statistical fact does not account for all of the variability in implicit measures (Nosek et al., 2007,
pp. 276–277).
16 As an example of this, Olson and Fazio (2003) show that the lack of correlation between IAT and the Bona Fide Pipeline (BFP)
priming task is due to different categorization demands. The race IAT forces categorizing by race, whereas the traditional BFP (and
many other priming measures) do not explicitly require categorizing by race. Thus, in cases where results from IAT and priming mea-
sures do not correlate, part of the explanation involves differential categorization.
17 Importantly, and somewhat depressingly, the results were not reversed. White participants did not display behavior indicating
implicit bias against the famous, disliked White people, like Adolf Hitler.
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confirm our prediction that implicit biases often break down in conceptual combination and subcate-
gorization. Thus, we have further evidence that IATs and priming studies, common measures of
implicit bias, detect salient-statistical associations, and these associations behave just as one would
expect any salient-statistical properties of concepts to behave.
In contrast, centrally encoded features are predicted to have a quite different compositional behavior
compared to salient-statistical associations, including those detected by common measures of implicit
bias. In particular, the more central a feature is to a concept, the more likely it is to survive sub-
categorizations and conceptual combinations involving that concept (Hampton, 1987, 2006; Murphy,
2002). For example, the feature +BORN OF LION PARENTS is a central feature of LIONS (c.f., Keil,
1989). According to dominant models of concept composition, this entails that this feature will be more
stable across composition and subcategorization than the less central but salient feature +MANE. This
seems intuitively correct. For example, note that our mane-less YOUNG LION, FEMALE LION, and
TRIMMED LION all clearly do inherit the feature +BORN OF LION PARENTS. Similarly, suppose
we are back at the lion nursery, now operating with the more specific representation BABY LIONS, we
can probably agree that although we will not be looking out for manes or hiding behind desks from the
baby lions, we still would assume that the baby lions were born in the usual way.18
At this point, it should be clear that the degree of centrality of features that encode biases is cru-
cially important to determine the biases’ wider role in social cognition. Assume f is more strongly
associated with WOMAN than with MAN. Suppose we now establish that f is, in addition, highly
central to our conception of WOMAN, and in particular, more central than to our conception of
MAN. Being central, we expect that f will have the kind of cross-contextual stability characteristic
of such features. This means that it will be comparatively more resilient through conceptual combi-
nations and sub-categorizations. The more central the feature, the more likely it is to survive into
STRONG WOMAN, SWEDISH WOMAN, or CONGRESSWOMAN. As we have seen, measures
of saliency and cue validity can disassociate from centrality, thus it is possible that, independently
of the associative strength between f and WOMAN compared to that between f and MAN, f may be
more central for WOMAN and hence more likely to be inherited into all the subcategories of
WOMAN that we operate within our day-to-day social cognitions.
To sum up, what may initially seem like a technical distinction—namely the different behavior of
merely salient-statistical and central features in compositional combinations—turns out to illuminate a
general and fundamental difference in the behavior of implicit biases across contexts. This difference,
we have seen, has substantial consequences for how these features project across various manipulations
of context and affect the wider role of each kind of bias in social cognition.19 It follows that to predict
the stability of biases we need to determine the degree of centrality of the features which encode them.
6 | CONCLUSION: METAPHYSICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
We have argued that biases relevant to social cognition can be encoded in the dependency networks
of our conceptual representations. These biases have unique properties, including their behavior in
18 To be clear, we are not assuming that even highly central features of a concept C are analytic for C. We can imagine fantastic sce-
narios in which real lions are not born to lion parents. For our purposes, what matters is just the comparatively greater stability of cen-
tral features.
19 A caveat is in order. We showed that features that are merely associative are not strongly compositional and are only weakly pre-
served in subcategorization. Our examples focus mainly on features that have descriptive content. We should add that associations
that have emotional valence arguably are more stable in composition and subcategorization. This interesting point is orthogonal to our
main argument. For further discussion of compositionality and expressive terms/components, see Potts (2005, 2007).
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composition and subcategorization. We have seen that although these central biases cannot be
directly picked out using measures that track salient-statistical associations, there are many experi-
mental paradigms to study them. To conclude, we will briefly discuss the implications of our view
for current philosophical debates on the nature of implicit bias.
Debate abounds about the underlying nature of implicit bias.20 Are implicit biases beliefs or
belief-like attitudes? Some argue that the implicit biases probed by priming studies and IATs reveal
unconscious implicit beliefs (Mandelbaum, 2015) or belief-like propositional attitudes (De Houwer,
2014; Levy, 2014; Schwitzgebel, 2013). Others argue that implicit biases are unique kinds of asso-
ciative states. Tamar Gendler, for example, argues that implicit bias does not fall squarely into any
of our existing categories of mental phenomena. She argues that IAT and similar measures track
aliefs, a unique type of associative mental state. On this view, implicit biases are habitual affective
and behavioral responses to stimuli (Gendler, 2008).21 The taxonomy of biases laid out in this paper
provides a fruitful way to sharpen this debate.
One thing in common among these views about the metaphysics of implicit bias is that they tend
to assume that implicit bias is a uniform kind (Holroyd & Sweetman, 2016). When distinctions are
made, the focus usually is on the nature of the relata of a class of biases (e.g., cognitive
vs. affective). We have argued, however, that even if we focus just on the class of biases that
involve relations between concepts and cognitive features, implicit biases can be encoded in differ-
ent ways, including salient-statistical associations and dependency networks. It follows that we
should not assume that this broad class of implicit biases has a uniform underlying nature. Thus,
when investigating whether implicit biases are beliefs, we should examine each case independently.
For, not only may the answer be different for different kinds of implicit bias, each bias may corre-
spond to a different form of belief. Specifically, we should keep in mind that even if a particular
implicit bias is underwritten by a belief, the logical form of that belief might be quite different from
that of beliefs that underwrite other implicit biases.
To illustrate, consider the unjust bias involving the pairing of <MUSLIM, +AGGRESSIVE>.
In light of our taxonomy, we should not simply ask whether those who have this bias endorse
generic claims such as “Muslims are aggressive.” Generics can be interpreted in various ways, and
there are more direct and transparent ways to represent the alternative contents of each kind of bias.
Candidates include the following beliefs: (a) Muslims typically are aggressive, (b) compared to other
salient alternatives (i.e., other social/ethnic groups), Muslims tend to be proportionally more aggres-
sive (even if most of them are not aggressive), or (c) aggressiveness explains other typical properties
of Muslims or their communities. The logical form of each of these beliefs is crucially different:
(a) is about the distribution of aggressiveness among Muslims, (b) is about the cue validity of
aggressiveness for identifying a Muslim, and (c) is about the explanatory role and hence centrality
of aggressiveness in explaining other typical properties of Muslims. Clearly, the diagnostics we
should use to determine whether someone has each kind of belief should be subtly different as well.
For example, a subject with belief (a) is more likely to be surprised by evidence that large numbers
of Muslims are pacifist than someone with belief (b). In other words, statistical evidence of the real
distribution of aggressiveness among Muslims (e.g., that the overwhelming majority are not aggres-
sive), would more directly challenge someone with a belief of form (a) than of form (b). Revision of
the latter depends on additional information about the rate of aggressiveness among Muslims com-
pared to other relevant or comparable social groups.
20 See the edited volume by Brownstein and Saul (2016a) for an extended discussion of the metaphysics of implicit bias.
21 Machery (2016) offers an alternative to both belief and alief interpretations, according to which IAT and other such tasks measure
traits rather than attitudes themselves.
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We have seen that the beliefs that could underlie implicit biases may have substantially different
logical forms (which are hidden when we express them with a generic statement). The framework we
put forward also allows us to see that beliefs with the logical form of centrality, such as in (c) above,
have uniquely important practical consequences. To illustrate, suppose Mary believes that rollercoas-
ters are dangerous. This will then guide Mary’s practical and theoretical deliberations in certain ways.
For instance, if Mary also believes that one should not do dangerous things, Mary will tend to object
to riding rollercoasters. Now, if the form of this belief is just that rollercoasters are typically danger-
ous, then we can easily imagine a scenario in which information of some small improvements to roll-
ercoasters make Mary change her mind and consider them to be safe. However, suppose that Mary
believes that rollercoasters are inherently dangerous, in the sense that most of their important features
depend on their being somewhat dangerous. Then it is harder to imagine scenarios that would con-
vince Mary that rollercoasters are not dangerous. The latter kind of belief is more resilient.
The key point here is that determining the degree of centrality of a feature helps us predict to
what extent an implicit bias will behave in a way that is analogous to these kinds of resilient beliefs.
Recall that the degree of centrality of a feature f for a concept C determines, to a large extent, how
stable f is for C across contexts. If f is very central for C, then C will inherit f across many variations
in background contexts, including those that induce subcategorization. This entails that f would
behave as if it was encoded by a resilient belief. For example, suppose a measure of implicit associ-
ations shows, for group G, that +SMART is more strongly associated with MALE PROFESSOR
than with FEMALE PROFESSOR. To determine how stable this differential association is likely to
be across contexts, we have to determine whether +SMART is also more central for MALE PRO-
FESSOR. To the extent that it is, +SMART is more likely to be inherited into subcategories of
MALE PROFESSOR (e.g., MALE ENGLISH PROFESSOR) than of FEMALE PROFESSOR
(e.g., FEMALE ENGLISH PROFESSOR) and is more likely to survive variations of background
context (e.g., whether the judgment is made in an English or a Physics classroom setting). To the
extent that this holds, group G’s bias in favor of MALE PROFESSORS would be underwritten by a
resilient and central belief that male professors tend to be smarter than female professors, a finding
that would have enormous practical implications.
This brief discussion of the logical form and stability of beliefs and biases suggests that theorists
concerned with the metaphysical status of biases should also investigate questions about their degree of
centrality. Particular kinds of sensitivity to evidence are important factors in deciding whether a mental
state counts as a belief of a certain form. To carry out the relevant investigations, we need different kinds
of experiments than those that have dominated the implicit bias literature. Furthermore, those interested
in practical issues, including the design of efficient interventions, should also care about issues of cen-
trality. It is clear that the predicted resilience of a bias across contexts is of great practical significance.
These theoretical and practical implications provide further support for the main point of this paper,
namely, that there is a unique class of biases, encoded in the dependency networks of our conceptual
representations, that has been systematically overlooked by current empirical and philosophical work.
We hope this discussion will motivate empirical work aimed at uncovering actual instances of
dependency-based biases and theoretical work that reflects on both their nature and ethical implications.
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